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INTRODUCTION
This is another type of war new in its intensity, ancient in its origins-war by guerillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins; war by ambush instead of by combat; by infiltration, instead of aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him…a whole new kind of strategy, a wholly different kind of force, and therefore a new and wholly different kind of military training. 1 The September 11, 2001 attacks against the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon in Washington DC ushered in a new era of warfare. The United States (US) was now at war with a non-state actor, an enemy that would prove to be fundamentally different from anything the US had faced in several decades. This new enemy was not a traditional nation-state, regime, or alliance that US military forces had prepared and trained to fight. This new enemy was using terrorism and violence to advance their own unique political, theological, and ideological agendas. Nineteen days after the attacks, President George W. Bush addressed a joint session of Congress and stated, "Our War on terrorism begins with Al Qaeda, but does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated." 2 With this statement, the Global War on Terror (GWOT) began. However, this unique new enemy will not be defeated on the open battlefield with traditional means and forces. The US must use its full spectrum of resources, continually reassess the threat, and adapt its tactics and methods as the enemy adapts its own.
1 President John F. Kennedy, 1962. 2 Sean N. Kalic, Combating a Modern Hydra: Al Qaeda and the Global War on Terrorism.1. 5 Colin S. Gray, War, Peace and International Relations. (Routledge Publishing, New York, NY 2007) , 248. aspects of politics." 6 He stresses that different forms of warfare including terrorism, guerilla warfare, and conventional warfare mark an insurgency. O'Neill defines terrorism as "the threat or use of physical coercion, primarily against non-combatants, especially civilians, to create fear in order to achieve various political objectives."
LITERATURE REVIEW
"
7
Acknowledging that terrorism is a form of warfare often associated with insurgencies and not merely synonymous with insurgency is crucial to understanding insurgencies and terrorism.
Galula defines an insurgency as "a protracted struggle conducted methodically, step by step, in order to attain specific intermediate objectives leading finally to the overthrow of the existing order." 8 Insurgencies are typically most successful when they have the support of a sympathetic populace, whom guerillas seek to win over by propaganda, reform, and often coercion.
Insurgencies are often referred to as asymmetric, fought with guerilla tactics that use deception, ambush, and terror, as opposed to conventional force on force confrontation. O'Neill describes guerrilla warfare as "highly mobile, hit and run attacks by lightly to moderately armed groups that seek to harass the enemy and gradually erode his will and capability."
9
Colin Gray adds to the definition of terrorism when he states "terrorism is exemplary violence executed primarily for the purpose of inducing fear among the general public." 10 He believes that terrorists are engaged in warfare designed to erode the will of the enemy, through demoralization and exhaustion. However, Gray believes that terrorism can occur in two forms, either as a strategic stand-alone technique of warfare or as an adjunct to guerilla operations.
Terrorists cannot win militarily; they can only politically if the targeted government is coerced Gray, 256. and intimidated into offering political concessions or if the government overreacts in its retaliation and fuels an insurgency from an isolated terrorist campaign.
11
"While all warfare is an expression of politics, none is more pervasively so than irregular conflict. The irregular side, most probably employing a mixture of guerilla tactics and terrorism, will seek favorable political effect from several courses of action." 12 Combating terrorism has become a global effort. Counterterrorism is a struggle of political wills, waged preeminently by the police and other security services, with the military acting in reserve. The most important weapon for the counter-terrorist is information. 13 The war of ideas is crucial to today's terrorist, guerilla, and insurgent. Two of major terrorist organizations that pose the greatest potential threat to the US are Al Qaeda and Hezbollah; both are motivated by two very powerful yet distinct ideologies.
Al Qaeda and Hezbollah may not share the same ideology, but ideology is a key component of why these groups undertake violent action. An ideology is a framework of ideas that describes a view of reality and a set of social and political actions that should be undertaken to change and improve the situation of a particular group. 14 To succeed the insurgent or terrorist must win the war of ideas; the counter-terrorism forces cannot allow this to happen. Ideologies are thus difficult to combat using military forces, because ideas are extremely difficult to contain or destroy. 
METHODOLOGY
This paper furthers the understanding of disparate insurgencies through a comparative analysis of Al Qaeda and Hezbollah. The "most similar systems comparative model" uncovers the main differences that exist between these two similar terror systems, Al Qaeda and Hezbollah.
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The main goal is to show that the crucial divergence between Hezbollah and Al Qaeda allows for differing opportunities and a more nuanced US counter-terrorism approach when combating an amorphous, international, loosely tied, non-state movement versus a much more state sponsored, one could argue even state created, terror organization. Al Qaeda and Hezbollah were chosen because they pose the greatest threat to the United States and its global interests and they are at the forefront of United States counter terror efforts. They have several notable similarities, yet still show significant and important divergence. Both groups are motivated by extreme ideologies; Sunni inspired Al Qaeda is motivated theologically by Salafi-jihadism, whereas Hezbollah's ideology is motivated by Iranian political objectives and a more inclusive stance on Islamic fundamentalism. Understanding the divergence between Al Qaeda and Hezbollah is crucial and will aid US counter-terrorism efforts. The main differences between Al Qaeda and Hezbollah will be addressed in detail within the specific cases studies of Al Qaeda and Hezbollah in this paper. The unique global impact that these groups have on crime, terrorism, and insurgency will also be examined. Once dissimilarities are identified, prescriptions for United
States counterterrorism strategy will be discussed. Every principle needs a vanguard to carry it forward and to put up with heavy tasks and enormous sacrifices. There is no ideology, neither earthly nor heavenly, that does not require…a vanguard that gives everything it possesses in order to achieve victory…It carries the flag along the sheer, endless and difficult path until it reaches its destination in the reality of life, since Allah has destined that it should make it and manifests itself. This vanguard constitutes the al-qaeda al-sulbah (strong foundation) for the expected society.
AL-QAEDA
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Azzam saw Al Qaeda as a base, a base composed of individuals that were committed to the cause, the cause to serve as a revolutionary vanguard to the strong. He further claims that suicide attack is the only way to wipe out the Zionists and that these suicide acts, not the United Nations, will protect the Palestinians.
Hezbollah's leadership believes that suicide attacks "shake the enemy from within, they plunge him into an existential crisis, and thus prepare the ground for victory." Hezbollah has filled a political and ideological vacuum in Lebanon by providing public services, extensive relief, and charity networks and is winning the battle for hearts and minds among many Lebanese. In the battle for hearts and minds, Hezbollah uses many methods to influence, directly or indirectly, the perceptions and insights of their target audiences. They use education, indoctrination, information, propaganda and psychological warfare. The battle is waged not only to reinforce the positions of supporters but to win over neutral and hostile target audiences. The weapons used are often virtual; pictures and video shown on local and satellite television, the written word, hard-copy media, the Internet, radio broadcasts, and sermons from the local mosques. 56 The damage caused by such virtual weapons and their long-and short-term influence on morale are no less than those of real bombs or bullets. Hezbollah has shown a much higher incidence of targeted assassination for specific political purposes. Salafi-jihadism inspired Al Qaeda terrorist attacks typically result in high casualty counts and considerable collateral damage. Hezbollah attacks show "a propensity toward 75 Ibid., 54.
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individual, targeted killings of specific people with a calibrated eye toward minimizing collateral damage to surrounding individuals and property." 78 The specific targets for Sunni terrorist killings are more ambiguous. The line between their targeted killings and a more generic attack against a hated group or location often is blurred. In the case of an attack against a US embassy, Hezbollah is more likely to assassinate the ambassador or other governmental officials where Al
Qaeda is more likely to bomb the entire embassy killing dozens of people. Since the bombings of the two US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 and the 9/11 attacks in 2001, the US has begun to safeguard significant overseas political, cultural, and executive buildings thwarting potential Al Qaeda attacks. Hezbollah would most likely target US diplomats, government officials, military leaders and prominent businessmen and educators, forcing the US to reprioritize its safeguarding efforts and counterterrorism policies throughout the world.
Al Qaeda and Hezbollah have fundamental differences in their approach to publicity and propaganda of terror events. Al Qaeda's approach to information management tends to feature doctrine and resources geared to take immediate credit and to widely amplify a terrorist event, treating publicity as an independent variable to be manipulated and enhanced. 79 Hezbollah has shown a propensity toward low-key publicity regarding specific terrorist incidents and a reliance on normal press coverage to broadcast their attacks. They seem to prefer plausible deniability in their operations in order to avoid retribution or global condemnation. Al Qaeda is identifiable with immediate image transmission and attack glorification using advanced and sophisticated media outlets. For Al Qaeda, recording and documenting their terror attacks is essential. They use additional operatives to record the attacks for rapid transmittal, exploitation, and propaganda. Al Qaeda has developed its own media production capability. Al Shahab is responsible for Al Qaeda's media production and al Fajr handles Al Qaeda's media distribution, promulgating 78 Ibid., 55.
79 Ibid., 57.
images, and interpreting its terror attacks. This network takes advantage of emerging technologies, including satellite television, cellular phones and the internet. Following the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, Al Qaeda was able to globally broadcast information on the attacks, disseminate images of death and destruction, and claim credit for the attacks.
Despite their propensity for low-key publicity, Hezbollah has its own media empire.
Hezbollah uses its media sources to promote the Palestinian struggle, provoke the escalation of terrorism, exert pressure on the moderate/Pro-western Arab regimes, and to enhance the status and impact of Hezbollah. 80 Al-Manar and al-Nour target Israel and western nations with psychological warfare messages to demoralize Israel. Hezbollah prefers to let their terrorism speak for itself and rarely champions their own work.
The divergence between Al Qaeda and Hezbollah terror is meaningful. US counterterrorism efforts will be challenged without Al Qaeda-like quick claims of responsibility.
Al Qaeda's obsession with the immediate image and rapid dissemination of their attacks allows counterintelligence and law enforcement a pattern for use in safeguarding prominent, highly visible potential terror targets. Future Hezbollah terror targets will be much harder to determine and deter, and when the targets have been attacked, the operatives will be much harder to track down and capture. Gray, 254. 83 Ibid., 258. They want to discredit them, causing chaos, and disorder with their states.
Both groups will exploit failed or failing states and ungoverned spaces to create small pockets of Islamic resistance, to serve as bases for training and launching attacks against US and Western interests. However, Hezbollah is more inclined to focus on states with Iranian embassies or consulates in order to conduct its operations. To deny Hezbollah safe havens and training areas, US intelligence efforts must focus on vulnerable embassies and Shi'a diasporas within weak and failing states that appear to be open to Shi'a inspired activities. Al Qaeda will likely target the small enclaves within ungoverned spaces. In the long-term, Al Qaeda hopes these small enclaves will grow and mature into the global caliphate, eventually stretching from the Atlantic to 84 Unfolding the Future of the Long War, 125. many. Any US effort to strengthen these elites must be a project for several decades, to be carried out quietly and with the greatest caution. The US could also pressure Middle Eastern governments to allow greater political participation and visibility for groups that oppose Al Qaeda and Salafi-jihadis. It is paramount for US and Western forces to put a Muslim face on this approach.
Propaganda is crucial to the terrorist and the counter-terrorist. Positive public opinion is necessary for Al Qaeda and Hezbollah to attract new recruits. Conversely, these terrorist movements decline in popularity when perceived to be attacking and killing fellow Muslims, causing public disorder, damaging critical national industries, or engaging in sectarianism. The US must fund media campaigns that focus on turning Muslim public opinion against Al Qaeda and Hezbollah but in a low key and indirect manner. Once again, the US must put an Arab or Muslim face on their efforts. Furthermore, the US must recast its ineffectual public diplomacy efforts by using surrogates and friends to avoid unwanted perceptions. Both Hezbollah and Al Qaeda possess highly experienced propaganda empires that can negate positive US efforts, generate ill will, and discredit US and ally efforts.
Counter-terrorism, counter-intelligence, and force protection efforts in the Middle East have primarily focused on Sunni and Salafi-Jihadist inspired terror organizations like Al Qaeda.
At a local level, it would seem that US efforts against Al Qaeda have severely disrupted their organization. Despite these successes, Al Qaeda has shown a remarkable ability to adapt and maintain the integrity of their terrorist training through the proliferation of a virtual, internet based jihad, and the diffusion of urban training centers within private homes and warehouse type spaces worldwide. However, Al Qaeda is not the only threat facing the US.
Hezbollah's Iranian inspired terror remains a severe threat. Unlike Al Qaeda's Salafijihadist ideology, Hezbollah is not directly tied to Shi'a theology or doctrine. As previously stated, Hezbollah is motivated by distinct policy objectives with discrete start and stop points linked to achieving decisive political objectives. Hezbollah will use an array of techniques from suicide bombings to kidnapping to targeted assassinations to achieve these objectives. In addition, because of the value of state-sponsorship to Hezbollah, US and western leaders should anticipate a possible intense terror campaign if and when Hezbollah or Tehran feels threatened by western policies or actions within the Middle East. US counter-terrorism policies must adapt and change to counter this unique, emerging threat. Hezbollah may seem to have been dormant, with the exception of Lebanon, in many parts of the world. Nevertheless, the US cannot rely on the current status quo, especially if the US or Israel were to instigate Iran. The US should anticipate Hezbollah to respond with terror in response to an Israeli or US military strike against Iran.
The US has naturally focused on Al Qaeda and Salafi-Jihadist inspired terrorism since 9/11 but increased attention on Hezbollah is critical for the US to protect its forces and interests overseas. As relations with Iran become more and more contested in regards to their nuclear ambitions or their role in Iraq, the US must think seriously about the ramifications of military In order for US and Western counter-terrorism efforts to be successful, they must continue to focus on countering Al Qaeda and Hezbollah's ideologies. Through moderate Muslim religious leaders, efforts must focus on the need to accentuate ideological alternatives to the extremist ideologies, while at the same time undercutting the integrity of these extreme ideas.
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Efforts should engage liberal Muslims which comprise the majority of the population, in hopes of delegitimizing the terrorist's extreme beliefs. The US must assist Middle Eastern governments to prevent abuses, corruption, and bad policy that enflame extreme ideologies and legitimizes terrorism. Governments must address the typical grievances, like discrimination, unemployment, and persecution that feed these extreme ideologies and benefit the terrorist organizations.
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Intelligence and information must be the focus of the counter-terrorist efforts to counter radical ideology. 
CONCLUSION
It is a persistently methodical approach and steady pressure which will gradually wear the insurgent down. The government must not allow itself to be diverted either by countermoves on the part of the insurgent or by the critics on its own side who will be seeking a simpler and quicker solution. There are no short-cuts and no gimmicks.
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"The war on terror at its most fundamental level goes to the war of ideas."
92 Ideology is a powerful message that motivates and propels ordinary human beings into action. It frames organizational structure, both leadership and member's motivation, their recruitment and support, and shapes the group's strategies and tactics. Ideology, not poverty or illiteracy, is the key driver of politically motivated violence. In the post-9/11 environment, the centrality of ideology in terrorism has become increasingly evident.
Al Qaeda and Hezbollah present tremendous irregular warfare challenges. They exist locally and globally and do not subscribe to international laws of war or conduct. They are waging long-term, protracted warfare against the enemies of Islam, namely Israel and the US.
They have shown a remarkable ability to regenerate their numbers, educating future generations of militants to carry on their struggle. Al Qaeda will continue to engage the United States in order to rally locals behind their movement, drain the US of its resources, and put pressure on the apostate pro-West regimes allied with the US.
Understanding the significant divergence between Hezbollah and Al Qaeda will aid the US and other Western nations engaged in global counter-terrorism efforts. and seditious Salafi-jihadist network websites to recruit and train its operatives. Al Qaeda relies heavily on the sympathetic coreligionist community to facilitate their activities. Hezbollah does not rely on Shi'a protection; it centers its efforts on Iranian embassies, consulates, and its own social service centers. Al Qaeda typically kidnaps to kill, hoping to gain an immediate propaganda victory; Hezbollah's propensity is to kidnap innocents in order to barter with them in hopes of gaining future advantage. Hezbollah exhibits a much higher incidence of targeted assassinations for specific political gains versus the high-casualty killings of Al Qaeda's terrorism. Finally, Al Qaeda's information operations and propaganda campaigns feature doctrine and resources geared to taking immediate credit to amplify their terrorist events. Hezbollah takes a more profound, yet low-key approach towards strategic communications and propaganda in waging their information operations campaigns.
To counter terrorist ideology and to provide an alternative ideology, it is necessary to know its key ideologues, organizational structures, the evolving ideology, and its community. Al Qaeda's ideology simply seeks to move, incite, and mobilize the Muslim nation into global revolution against the West and Middle Eastern apostate regimes. Hezbollah's Iranian backed ideology calls for the consistent and relentless struggle against Israel until its annihilation and
